among the central bank, the banking system and the non-bank public in causing variations in that crucial variable, the quantity of money. They shared Friedman=s view that, no matter how it got into circulation, the effects of money would often be very much the same, but they treated this as a conclusion to be established analytically, and in a way that would reveal when exceptions might arise, rather than as an hypothesis to be maintained pending its empirical refutation.
Brunner and Meltzer also took a special interest in the effects of institutional constraints on the conduct of monetary policy, and in the influence on that conduct of beliefs about the way the economy works.
2
This book is, then, the product of a distinctive brand of monetarism, and represents an important extension of a research agenda that has been active for over three decades. It emphasises two overarching issues that are of great interest to modern monetary economists: central bank independence, and the role of economic theory in conditioning agents= behaviour. It also yields lessons that many will find unfamiliar. First, the Fed=s history makes it clear that problems arising from the interaction of politics with monetary policy are not of a sort that can be solved once and for all, for example by implementing the appropriate contract between the government and the central bank; rather, the challenge was (as it still is) to design institutions that are resilient enough to cope on an ongoing basis with the tensions these problems create.
Secondly, and without denigrating the importance of the beliefs of the public at large, it is policy makers who hold the centre of the stage in Meltzer=s history, and he shows that their behaviour was often conditioned not by true economic theories, but by false theories that they believed to be true, that these theories often differed among policy makers at a particular moment, and that they changed over time too.
In this essay, I shall discuss some highlights of Meltzer=s treatment of these two themes, and in the final substantive section, I shall take up what seems to me to be an important element 2 That interest may be seen as a particular example of their long-standing curiosity, reflected in a number of papers that they commissioned over the years for Carnegie-Rochester conferences, about how and why particular economic ideas become embedded in particular institutions and condition their activities for long periods of time.
that is missing from his account. It is a crude simplification of Meltzer=s subtle history to describe it as the story of what happened when monetary policies designed in the light of a series of variations on the real bills doctrine (to be defined below) were applied to an economy in which the quantity theory of money was a closer approximation to the truth, but to put matters this way highlights a question that still badly needs an answer: namely, why was policy so often based on misleading ideas when more accurate alternatives were available? Why did the quantity theory have so little influence on the theory and practice of central banking in the United States in the early years of the Federal Reserve System?
II
When the Federal Reserve System began operations, the theory of central banking was already more than a century old, as Meltzer stresses, and such institutions had long existed elsewhere.
The United States had done without one, but they had not done all that well. Serious financial crises involving important bank failures continued to plague the United States long after they had become things of the past, for example, in Britain. After the crisis of 1907, then, there began to emerge a consensus that some kind of institutional overhaul was needed, but not about the form it should take.
The system that Congress created in 1913 was a compromise. 3 It consisted of not one national central bank, modelled on the then privately owned and highly independent Bank of England, as some had wanted, but of twelve regional central banks, whose activities were to be overseen and perhaps co-ordinated from Washington. Thus the benefits of an Aelastic currency@ provided by an institution (or rather twelve of them) that could also act as a Alender(s) of last resort@ in times of crisis, would be made available to the American banking system. The power that a single such institution based in New York might have wielded was diversified away from that centre to be shared with eleven others, while the influence of private interests over policy was balanced by making the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller of the Currency ex 3 Meltzer tells us rather little about the deliberations and debates that led up to this compromise. Readers who wish to know more about these matters should consult Robert Dimand (2002) and Perry Mehrling (2002) . expenditures were financed, and of dealing with the domestic impact of the gold flows generated by the suspension of the gold standard in Europe, but, once the war was over, it had to learn how to operate in a world where the rules of the gold standard imposed essentially no constraints on domestic policy.
Furthermore, the restoration of order to the international monetary system presented a major challenge in its own right, which the Fed could hardly ignore, and here its task was further complicated by the dominance of isolationism in the US politics of the 1920s. Meltzer seems to me to pay insufficient attention to this last fact, and readers who wish to follow up its implications in more detail are referred to Priscilla Roberts (2000) , a recent and important study In 1913, when gold convertibility still anchored the price level, a central bank that acted in accordance with the real bills doctrine to meet the domestic Aneeds of trade@ for an elastic supply of bank credit against such a background could not do much harm. 6 In the 1920s, however, the inadequacies that were always latent in that doctrine were more difficult to overlook. In particular, though it advised that banks should discount only (but all) good quality bills offered to them, it was silent on how to choose the interest rate at which such credit was to be granted. Under the gold standard, international movements of the metal had indicated when policy was tight or loose, and when interest rates should be lowered or raised, but with the international monetary system in disarray, and America=s own system insulated from gold by the sterilisation of inflows, these signals were no longer available. The Fed badly needed some new 5 Thomas J. Sargent and Neil Wallace (1982) appropriated the label Areal bills doctrine@ and attached it to a policy prescription that Aasserts that unrestricted intermediation either by private banks or by a central bank has beneficial economic effects and should be promoted by public policy@ (p. 1212) This doctrine, which they contrasted with an extremely primitive version of the quantity theory, is, at best , only tangentially related to the historical real bills doctrine, and though their paper stands as an important contribution to modern monetary economics, their attempts to relate its analysis to earlier debates in monetary economics were misleading.
operational guidelines, therefore.
Before 1935, each district bank was able to set its own discount rate, and was, in effect, operating within a national monetary system that resembled a small-scale gold standard world of its own. That is perhaps why many of their Governors never really appreciated that the real bills doctrine was at best inadequate, and at worst downright misleading, as a guide to policy at the level of the system as a whole, but even some members of the Board in Washington, notably Adolph Miller, the only one with credentials as an academic economist, apparently remained strong supporters of the real bills doctrine throughout the 1920s. Its inadequacies were best appreciated within the New York District Bank. In the nation=s international financial centre, it was harder not to recognise how profoundly the dislocation of the international gold standard had affected the rules of the domestic monetary policy game.
Meltzer=s treatment of the interplay of ideas about these matters within the Fed from the 1920s onwards is a highlight of this book, and there is no space here to do justice to its many nuances. Suffice it to say that he convincingly shows that there was more to these interactions terms of which the Fed=s attempts at Acredit control@ in the 1920s were designed, was at the Board, while the other was at New York. In short, in Meltzer=s story, it was economic analysis, much more than geography, which defined divisions with the Federal Reserve before 1935, with personalities playing a supporting role. postulating that the banks were always reluctant to be in debt to the Fed, and it was argued that, as a result, their level of indebtedness could be used as an indicator of the stance of policy. Open market purchases thus gave the banks the funds needed to reduce their discounts, and eased policy, while sales forced them to borrow, and tightened it. In the 1930s, as positive excess reserves built up in the system, Meltzer suggests that this same doctrine was extended to imply that their growing level could be interpreted as a loosening of policy.
In making open market operations one of its central features, the Riefler-Burgess framework took the theory of monetary policy well beyond the passivity of a pure real bills approach based on discounting, but it was nevertheless vague about the significance of interest rates in the policy process, just as was the real bills doctrine itself. Indeed, Thomas Humphrey what proved to be its final stages, and the real economy was beginning to slow a little. It looked as if a cyclical upswing, more distinguished by its length and vigour than by any truly out-of-theordinary features, was coming to end. The collapse of the stock market in October of that year destabilised the financial system, and the Fed, one of whose functions in such circumstances was supposed to be to provide lender of last resort facilities, both to individual institutions and to the market, responded indecisively and half-heartedly. It did keep the monetary base growing slowly throughout the following three years, but the money supply contracted sharply, as banks and the non-bank public scrambled to increase their currency holdings. In part, the Fed=s hesitancy stemmed from fears (probably unfounded) about the adequacy of its gold reserves, and in part it stemmed from the fact that disagreements about what action to take were impossible to resolve quickly within its clumsy decision making structure.
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But the most important source of trouble in Meltzer=s view was the influence of economic ideas. Both the real bills and Riefler-Burgess doctrines suggested that low nominal interest rates and excess reserves in the banking system indicated that monetary policy was loose. A majority of decision makers within the Fed were thus able to convince themselves, and many others too, that policy was expansionary and that its failure was the result of an inherent weakness of monetary measures in the face of the economy=s collapse.
Not all contemporary observers agreed. Lauchlin Currie, an instructor at Harvard, who would become the principal economic advisor to Governor Marriner Eccles in 1935, described the Fed=s policy in 1929-33 as A. . . actually one of almost complete passivity and acquiescence@ (Currie, 1934, p. 147) , as Meltzer notes. Moreover, as early as 1932, Jacob Viner complained explanation, particularly given the attention he pays to the international considerations throughout his account of the period. Like Friedman and Schwartz, his monetarist explanation of the Contraction is mainly directed at why it became so severe after 1930. 9 The issue concerned the requirements for the gold backing of Federal Reserve notes written into the Federal Reserve Act. To the extent that this was ever a genuine problem, it was resolved by the passage of the GlassSteagall Act of 1932, but before then, rightly or wrongly, many commentators believe that these requirements need not have constrained policy. and Friedman and Schwartz (1963 pp.404-406) Meltzer=s interpretation of events is hardly novel, then, nor does he make that claim; but his use of the archives to document the extent to which real bills and related ideas permeated policy discussions within the system, and of the absence from those discussions of ideas about the importance of the quantity of money and the real-nominal interest rate distinction, is more than enough to establish the importance of his new version of this old story. Even those officials within the system who showed themselves capable of thinking beyond the bounds of prevailing doctrines, and argued for more expansionary policies than were in fact implemented -Adolph
Miller at the Board, for example, and Randolph Burgess in New York -seem to have been oblivious to the latter distinction. Now when Friedman and Schwartz (1963) finally established the respectability of the view that the Great Depression was the consequence of a failure of monetary policy, this was seen as a deeply Aconservative@ development within macroeconomics. In the early 1960s, mainstream opinion had it that the Depression provided clear evidence of a deep flaw in the very mechanics of the market economy that prevented it making use of all available productive resources, or, as it was often put, evidence that Say=s law was fallacious. This view provided the rationale for the activist agenda, based on fiscal tools, that dominated the policy scene in the post-World-War-2 years. In the 1930s, however, those who questioned Say=s Law, and those who took the more modest position that it was important to get monetary policy right, were in the same policy-activist camp, arguing against others who believed that, once it had started, the right policy was to let the Depression take it course.
The latter view derived directly from the real bills doctrine, and its exponents often saw the seeds of depression as having been sown by the discount rate cuts implemented by Benjamin
Strong in 1927 to help Montague Norman maintain the newly re-established convertibility of sterling into gold at its pre-1914 parity. 10 These cuts, it was argued, had encouraged credit creation in the United States on a scale greater than the needs of trade required, which had therefore fuelled Aspeculative investment@ in the stock market and an unsustainable investment boom. To make matters worse in the eyes of his critics, shortly before his death in 1928, Strong had opposed attempts by the Fed to limit the purposes for which bank credit was to be used.
According to the real bills doctrine, the inevitable consequences of speculative lending were a financial crisis and a slump that simply had to be endured in order to rid the economy of the imbalances created during the preceding boom.
The fact that such reasoning was used by, among others, Herbert Hoover himself, to make Strong a scapegoat for a Depression that had happened after his death is perhaps one reason why those who like to pin much of the blame for the Depression on Hoover also sometimes try to enlist Strong as an economic saviour manque, who might have prevented the catastrophe. It is also tempting for those who are more inclined to lay responsibility at the door of a Fed dominated by the real bills doctrine to take a similar view, and Meltzer flirts with it, albeit a little more hesitantly than did Friedman and Schwartz.
To the extent that the Fed=s weak and vacillating policy towards the depression stemmed simply from indecision brought on by intellectual muddle, Strong=s presence would surely have 10 There is strong similarity between these views, and those that derived from Austrian business cycle theory as expounded by, for example, Friedrich von Hayek (1931) (Douglas, 1927, p. 37) in orthodox economics underpinned by Say=s law, and they concluded that a market economy would always operate at less than full employment unless stimulated by government spending funded by money creation. In their view, (Foster and Catchings 1925, pp. 338-339) , the Fed=s wartime policy of financing bank lending to the public to enable them to buy Liberty Bonds and hence provide the means for government spending, under the slogan ABorrow and Buy Bonds@, was an example of how monetary policy should always be conducted; small wonder that, under Eccles leadership, monetary policy=s principal role was to support fiscal policy.
But it was also under his leadership that the Fed helped to precipitate the sharp recession of 1937-38, and here his new ideas were not to blame. As Friedman and Schwartz (1963, Ch. 8) documented, the US banking system had begun to accumulate excess reserves after 1933, and by 1936 these had grown to the extent that actual reserve ratios were at roughly twice their required level. This development was widely interpreted, inside but also outside of the Fed, as signalling increasing monetary ease, and hence as carrying with it considerable potential for inflation should the banks suddenly begin lending. Reserve requirements were therefore significantly increased to forestall this possibility, in the expectation that this would have no effect on current monetary conditions. In fact, however, the banks took quick action to restore their free reserves to previous levels, interest rates rose, the money stock shrank and a recession ensued. Currie=s quantity theoretic approach to monetary policy differed strongly from that of Henry Simons and his associates at Chicago in advocating discretionary measures rather than rules. In common with them, however, he held a view of the relationship between bank reserves and deposits in which variations in excess reserves reduced the Fed=s ability to control the money supply because they were unpredictable. That is why, in 1934, at the request of Jacob Viner, he prepared a memorandum for Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, advocating the imposition of 100 per cent. reserve requirements against demand deposits, at about the same time as the essentially similar Chicago Plan for banking reform, described by Albert G. Hart (1935) .
emerged.
As Ronnie J. Phillips (1995) has documented, vigorous efforts to have 100 per cent reserves written into the 1935 Federal Reserve Act were made by Currie within the system, and several others outside it, but they came to nothing. As a result, in 1936, there were many quantity theorists, including Simons (1936, fn. 18) , who were every bit as worried as Currie, or any adherent of the Riefler-Burgess doctrine, about imminent inflation. 11 Meltzer discusses Currie=s views on 100 per cent reserves (p. 467, fn. 107, and p. 474) but not the rest of the literature, and he only touches lightly on their raison d=etre. This is perhaps why he attributes to only one 11 Currie remained convinced until the end of his life in 1993 of the inflationary threat implicit in the build up of excess reserves in the mid-1930s, and of the appropriateness of raising reserve requirements in order to deal with it. Interestingly, the abovementioned footnote from Simons is heavily marked in Currie=s personal copy of the paper, though when this was done is unknown. I am indebted to Currie=s biographer, Roger Sandilands, for this information. Preparations for the restoration of order to the international monetary system began well before the war=s end, but with isolationist tendencies at an essentially permanent low ebb in the political arena, there was no vacuum here for the Fed to fill, as it had after the earlier conflict. The negotiations that led to the creation of the Bretton Woods system, the financial arrangements associated with the reconstruction of Europe, and so on, were all handled by the Treasury, with the Fed. playing only a relatively minor advisory role.
The major issues with which Meltzer=s first volume ends are, therefore, the growing tension between the Fed and the Treasury about debt management, and the Accord of 1951 under which the executive branch of government conceded power over interest rates to the central bank, thus finally establishing its Aindependence within government@ nearly four decades after its foundation. Meltzer=s account of this affair makes fascinating reading, though some of its novelty has been pre-empted by Robert L. Hetzel and Ralph F. Leach (2001) , whose paper must have appeared too late to be taken into account by him.
The Treasury was anxious to minimise its debt service costs, particularly after the outbreak of the Korean War, and was supported by President Truman, who, having lost money 14 Meltzer, however, treats 19 th century British thought in so much detail that he leaves himself little room to discuss a great deal that happened from the 1870s onwards, not least in the United States, which profoundly influenced the form that the Fed took in 1913 and the ideas which found their way into, or were kept out of, the system. Irving Fisher's work is discussed, and Meltzer rightly pays tribute to its quality. He also justifiably laments that Fisher's ideas about the role of the quantity of money in monetary policy, and the real-nominal interest rate distinction, had no influence on policy for a good four decades after he developed them.
Crucially, however, Meltzer leaves it unclear why such ideas made so little headway outside of academic discourse during his period.
I suggest that a major missing link in his story is the highly politicised controversy about bimetallism, to which the slow deflation that began in gold standard countries in the early 1870s
and persisted till the late 1890s, gave rise. This controversy reached its climax in the United
States with the 1896 presidential election, in which the populist Democrat William Jennings
Bryan -Ayou shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold@ -was defeated by William
McKinley, though matters were not finally settled until the passage of the Gold Standard Act in 1900 and Bryan=s second defeat in that year=s election (Friedman and Schwartz 1963 pp. 118-119) . In Britain, the debate was less sensational, but it did attract much public attention and prompted the setting up of the important Gold and Silver Commission that reported in 1889.
14 I have some reservations about Meltzer's treatment of Thornton. He gives Thornton almost equal credit for ideas that he self-consciously developed at considerable length in more than one place, and which were central to his contribution -for example his devastating critique of the real bills doctrine -and for others that he mentioned only in passing, and which had to be rediscovered by others -such as the distinction between the real and nominal interest rate, which he made only once, in an 1811 House of Commons speech in support of the Bullion Report.
Meltzer also downplays some non-monetarist themes that were central to Thornton=s work -for example his insistence that bills of exchange formed an important part of the Acirculating medium@. Paper Credit was, in any event, little known in the 1920s. Jacob Hollander (1911) and James Angell (1926) both confused Henry Thornton with his brother Samuel, who was a Director and sometime Governor of the Bank of England, approached the book as an apologia for the Bank, and failed to appreciate its merits. Jacob Viner (1924) dealt only with Thornton=s treatment of the transfer problem.
Economic ideas lined up in essentially identical ways in both countries. Those who favoured the introduction of silver into a bimetallic monetary system defended their position, as I pointed out in Laidler (2000) , by deploying the quantity theory to demonstrate that such a reform would enable deflation to be brought to an end. Their number, however, included many outright inflationists, whose extremism both embarrassed their more responsible allies, and made an easy mark for defenders of the gold standard. Notable among the latter group were Sir Robert Giffen in Britain and James Laurence Laughlin in the US. Giffen, a leading public intellectual of his day, had been Bagehot=s assistant editor at the Economist, and remained thereafter a promoter of of Bagehotian common sense in monetary matters, while Laughlin, the first professor of economics at the University of Chicago, had forged strong ties to the Republican Party in the 1890s. Both were profoundly conservative in their economics, using a cost of production theory of value to attack the quantity theory and to defend gold monometallism as the only natural basis for the monetary system, and Laughlin was also a powerful exponent of the real bills doctrine.
The upshot of all this was that, at the time of the Fed=s creation, practical people in general, and bankers in particular, who were unquestioning supporters of the gold standard, regarded the quantity theory of money as discredited, and essentially synonymous with inflationism. This state of affairs largely accounts for which ideas influenced the Fed in its early years and which did not. Bagehot's Lombard Street had a direct influence on some of the System's founders, but, despite its great wisdom about the conduct of monetary policy under the gold standard, it was not a quantity theory based book. The association of the quantity theory with inflationism from the 1880s onwards accounts, I suspect, not just for its marginalisation among central bankers in later years, but also for the fact that, even in the early 1930s, those among its exponents who were also defenders of the gold standard, Jacob Viner, for example, appeared to be quite radical in their views, and sometimes found themselves in the company of a wide variety of monetary expansionists, fiscal inflationists, underconsumptionists and outright cranks. 16 I wish Meltzer had paid more attention to these issues in this volume, and I hope that in the next part of his story, he will take up the question of why, when the quantity theory, in the guise of monetarism, finally did begin to become influential in policy circles, it made its foray, not from the political left as it had in earlier years, but from the right, and found itself in conflict with versions of the real bills doctrine that by then had become the property of a Keynesian, not to mention post-Keynesian, left.
16 Two books in particular document the interplay of these ideas in the 1930s. 
VI
Having said all this, the very breadth of Meltzer=s topic and the depth of his treatment make it inevitable that any reviewer will take issue with one or another of the many difficult judgements that went into making this book. Nothing that I have complained about above, therefore, should detract from the importance of what Meltzer has accomplished, or from the attention this beautifully produced and carefully indexed volume deserves. One can only hope that we do not have to wait too long for the second instalment.
